Language：Japanese   Publisher：Japan Association for Asian Studies  

On February 14, 1950, during Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. The USSR agreed to transfer all Soviet rights and property connected with the Chinese Changchun Railway (hereinafter, CCR) to China. In addition, The Russians agreed to transfer the CCR gratis to China by the end of 1952, to withdraw Soviet forces from Port Arthur and transfer facilities there to China after conclusion of a <i>peace</i> treaty with <i>Japan</i>, or not later than the end of 1952.<BR>After Stalin's death in 1953, Mao in 1958, stated, "We wanted the CCR but he [Stalin] wouldn't return it. However, one can pull the meat out of the tiger's mouth after all." What was the meaning of Mao's 'tiger – meat' metaphor?<BR>In brief, Stalin wanted the management of the CCR to be under Soviet control for as long as possible and was hesitant to negotiate its return in 1949. Mao on the other hand, wanted the rights for CCR's joint operation since its creation.<BR>Despite these issues, the Chinese were successful in securing the return of the CCR in December 1952. There were two reasons for their success. First, the business conditions of the CCR were not favorable for Russia. The Soviet manager of the CCR, Kovalev, reported this problem to Stalin in January 1950, a month before the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. According to him, the CCR was a burden to the national economy of the USSR. It is logical to surmise that Stalin accepted his opinion when agreeing to return the CCR in 1950.<BR>The second reason concerned the bargaining of the railway construction between China and the USSR. In August and September of 1952, a PRC delegation led by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Moscow for negotiations with Kremlin leaders. In the negotiations, Zhou accepted Stalin's demand to construct a railway between Mongolia and the North of China using Chinese laborers. The railway provided a direct link to Beijing for Russians. While Zhou was agreeable during the negotiations, the Chinese were disappointed with the agreement. The Chinese had wanted to construct the Lanzhou–Xinjiang railway; however, Zhou delayed its construction at Stalin's request.<BR>Finally, China and the USSR agreed to transfer the CCR in 1952. The returning ceremony of the CCR at the end of 1952 in Harbin became a symbolic event for the Soviet-Chinese alliance in the 1950s.

DOI： 10.11479/asianstudies.61.1_5

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Language：Japanese  

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Language：Japanese   Publisher：JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  

During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened and spread to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in bloody armed clashes along the border. The Sino-Soviet split was a critical topic for a British government establishing diplomatic relations with both the USSR and PRC. In December 1960, the British cabinet first recognized the Sino-Soviet split based on the information of the November meeting of 81 communist parties in Moscow. In the early 1960's, only a few diplomats and MI-6 members gave the matter much attention, but by the middle of the 60's, the degree of attention granted the issue increased year by year within the British government. The reason was the worsening diplomatic relations with the USSR and PRC. Leftist riots began in May 1967 in Hong Kong and were pro-communist labor disputes sympathetic to the Cultural Revolution on the mainland and against British rule. In August 1967, mobs of Chinese Red Guards broke into the British embassy compound and started huge fires. As a result, China-UK relations reached their lowest point since the Second World War. Meanwhile, the 'Prague Spring' in 1968, ended by Soviet military intervention, broke the detente between the USSR and UK. The UK was facing a diplomatic crisis with the two communist giants at the same time.<br>However, the situation changed drastically due to the border clash between the USSR and PRC in 1969. On March 2, a group of Chinese troops ambushed Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian) on the Ussuri River. During the Sino-Soviet military clashes along the border in 1969, the British government maintained its neutrality even though the USSR sought to gain her support. Based on its own intelligence and discussions with many countries, British diplomats and the Foreign Office concluded that this conflict would not lead to full scale war. In addition, they did not attempt to mediate between the parties because they thought that it was in the UK's interests to preserve its neutrality, especially as the UK had 'a particular reason for this because of its responsibility for Hong Kong'. In the event, their prognosis was correct and the Sino-Soviet split did not descend into nuclear war. In addition, the USSR and PRC tried to promote their relationship with the UK in order to gain a sympathetic hearing. The British Foreign Office promoted this foreign policy based on its level-headed analysis and its position of neutrality between the USSR and PRC finally gained success as the Sino-Soviet split became fierce towards the end of the 1960's.

DOI： 10.11375/kokusaiseiji.173_43

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Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1017/S0026749X09000171

Web of Science

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：The Historical Society of Japan  

The Chinese Eastern Railway (hereafter, CER), a useful shortcut for the Trans-Siberian Railway, was built by the Russian Empire under a contract concluded with the Qing Dynasty in 1896; and the resulting railway zone was administered solely by the Russians until 1917. Although the Russian community in the railway zone has been a popular topic of discussion among scholars in Japan, the U.S., Russia, and China, little is known about the railway zone itself, which comprised the legal and institutional structure of this "colony." The aim of this article is to clarify how the railway zone was formed, from the standpoints of both Russia and China. The article begins with an analysis of how the CER appropriated land. In the beginning, the scale of appropriation was limited to the immediate needs of railway construction ; later, however, S. Iu. Witte, the Russian finance minister and supervisor of the CER, instructed the railway engineers to expand appropriation to the greatest extent possible. In Harbin alone, which was the base of construction and the junction of the railway lines with the Songhua River, 11,533 hectares had been appropriated by 1902. The author argues that the reason for this was that Witte wanted the CER to sell or lease the land as a developer, in order to recover the cost of railway construction. The expansion of the railway zone was a concern for the Qing Dynasty's military governors in Manchuria, because such an expansion implied an increase in Russian influence within the Dynasty's homeland. Therefore, the governors made prompt attempts to Sinicize the area around the railway zone by means of colonies populated by Han settlers. The Russian Empire felt a sense of crisis in response to this movement and planned to settle Russian colonists within the railway zone. Eventually, the Qing Dynasty realized a significant increase in the Han population of Manchuria, while Russia's colonization plans did not materialize, owing to 1) a conflict of opinion among government ministries and 2) the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Despite its failure to realize a large-scale colonization project, Russian still managed to maintain extensive executive powers in the governance of the railway zone. The CER played the role of administrative organ and monitored both judicial affairs and the policing of the zone. It was in this way that Russia attempted to Russify the area. The railway zone was undeniably a part of Russia's informal empire ; however, China constantly sought opportunities to recapture sovereignty over the area. The railway zone would survive until the Manzhouguo government abolished it in 1936.

DOI： 10.24471/shigaku.119.9_1493

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Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：Japanese Society for the Study of Russian History  

The purpose of this paper is to examine the business strategy of the Chinese Eastern Railway(CER) using Port Vladivostok after the Russo-Japanese War and its impact on the Russian Far East. In the previous studies of the Russo-Chinese economic history, it has been often discussed and thought positive that the developments in the economic relations between Manchuria and Primorsky Krai after 1906. By contrast, in the previous studies of the domestic history of the Russian Far East, researchers negatively emphasized that the economic conflict between them. The point at issue in this argument is disvaluing of the role of the CER in this region. After the loss of port Dalian, the CER determined port Vladivostok as the central port of their company. The CER improved the port and enhanced the partnership with the marine transportation. So the transit goods from Manchuria, particularly wheat and soy, were exported in a large amount from port Vladivostok. But the business strategy of the CER didn't always consistent with the profits of the merchants of port Vladivostok. Because both side tried to dispense favors to their local. When these problems surfaced, the Priamur governor-general Nikolai Gondatti took economic protective policies and conflicted with the CER. These results lead to the conclusion that the CER is profitable for the bourgeois of the Russian Far East, but the deepening of the economic relations with the CER wasn't always welcomed by them.

DOI： 10.18985/roshiashikenkyu.82.0_42

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Total pages：254p   Language：Japanese

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Total pages：146   Responsible for pages：1～30  

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Total pages：264   Book type：Textbook, survey, introduction

Total pages：372   Responsible for pages：85～116   Language：Japanese Book type：Scholarly book

Total pages：471  

Responsible for pages：233-260   Language：Japanese Book type：General book, introductory book for general audience

Total pages：392   Language：Japanese Book type：Scholarly book

Responsible for pages：65～88   Language：English Book type：Scholarly book

Total pages：266   Language：Japanese Book type：General book, introductory book for general audience

Language：Japanese

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Total pages：344   Responsible for pages：297-309   Language：Japanese Book type：Scholarly book

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Total pages：812  

Responsible for pages：225-235   Language：Russian

Total pages：344   Responsible for pages：295-319   Language：Japanese Book type：Scholarly book